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Abstract. In ciphertext-policy attributed-based encryption (CP-ABE),
each ciphertext is labeled by the encryptor with an access structure (also
called ciphertext policy) and each private key is associated with a set of
attributes. A user should be able to decrypt a ciphertext if and only if
his private key attributes satisfy the access structure.
The traditional security property of CP-ABE is plaintext privacy,
which ciphertexts reveal no information about the underlying plain-
text. At ACNS’08, Nishide, Yoneyama and Ohta introduced the notion
of ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE. In addition to protecting the pri-
vacy of plaintexts, ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE also protects the
description of the access structures associated with ciphertexts. They
observed that ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE can be constructed from
attribute-hiding inner-product predicate encryption (PE), and presented
two constructions of ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE supporting re-
stricted access structures, which can be expressed as AND gates on
multi-valued attributes with wildcards. However, their schemes were only
proven selectively secure.
In this paper, we ﬁrst describe the construction of ciphertext-policy
hiding CP-ABE from attribute-hiding inner-product PE formally. Then,
we propose a concrete construction of ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE
supporting the same access structure as that of Nishide, Yoneyama and
Ohta, but our scheme is proven fully secure.
Keywords: Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption, Predicate
Encryption, Dual System Encryption.
1 Introduction
In many distributed ﬁle systems, it requires complex access-control mechanisms,
where access decisions depend upon attributes of the protected data and access
control policies assigned to users, or users can establish speciﬁc access control
policies on who can decrypt the protected data. Sahai and Waters [27] addressed
this issue by introducing the concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE). There
are two kinds of ABE schemes, key-policy and ciphertext-policy ABE schemes.
In a key-policy ABE scheme (KP-ABE) [15], every ciphertext is associated
with a set of attributes, and every user’s secret key is associated with an access
structure on attributes. Decryption is enabled if and only if the ciphertext at-
tribute set satisﬁes the access structure associated with the user’s secret key. In
F. Bao and J. Weng (Eds.): ISPEC 2011, LNCS 6672, pp. 24–39, 2011.
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a ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) scheme [4], the situation is reversed. That
is, attributes are associated with user’s secret keys and access structures (also
called ciphertext policies) with ciphertexts.
Prior work on CP-ABE [4,11,31] has focused on the security property that ci-
phertexts reveal no information about the underlying plaintext, called plaintext
privacy. Nishide et al. [23] introduced the notion of ciphertext-policy hiding CP-
ABE, i.e., CP-ABE that has both plaintext privacy and ciphertext-policy privacy.
The latter refers to privacy protection of access structures associated with ci-
phertexts. Nishide et al. [23] also presented two constructions of ciphertext-policy
hiding CP-ABE supporting restricted access structures, which can be expressed
as AND gates on multi-valued attributes with wildcards. However, their schemes
were only proven in a weak model, which can be considered to be analogous
to the selective-ID model [9,5] used in identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes.
Ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE has a wide range of applications. For example,
in some military circumstances, the access control policy itself could be sensitive
information.
1.1 Our Contributions
As mentioned in [23], CP-ABE can be constructed from inner-product pred-
icate encryption (PE) [17]. In this paper, we formally describe the construc-
tion of ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE from attribute-hiding inner-product
PE in detail. This CP-ABE supports a wide range of access structures on at-
tributes, including arbitrary conjunctive normal form (CNF) and disjunctive
normal form (DNF).
We also present a concrete construction of ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE
supporting the same access structure as that of [23]. The scheme works in the
composite-order setting [7], but we can use the method proposed by Freeman
[12] to transform our scheme into one in the prime-order setting. Compared with
[23], our scheme applies the dual system encryption methodology [30] to obtain
full security. The security proof of the scheme does not rely on random oracles
[3], and the scheme is more eﬃcient than the instantiated construction from
attribute-hiding inner-product PE.
1.2 Related Work
The notion of ABE was ﬁrst introduced by Sahai and Waters as an application of
their fuzzy identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [27], where both ciphertexts
and secret keys are associated with sets of attributes. Decryption is enabled if
and only if the ciphertext and secret key attribute sets overlap by at least a ﬁxed
threshold value d.
Goyal et al. [15] formulated two complimentary forms of ABE: KP-ABE and
CP-ABE. They also presented the ﬁrst KP-ABE supporting monotonic access
structures. To enable more ﬂexible access control policy, Ostrovsky et al. [26] pre-
sented the ﬁrst KP-ABE system that supports the expression of non-monotone
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formulas in key policies. Goyal et al. [14] gave a general way to transform KP-
ABE into CP-ABE. Chase [10] considered the problem of ABE with multiple
authorities.
The notion of predicate encryption (PE) [17] is related to key-policy ABE.
In a PE scheme, secret keys correspond to predicates and ciphertexts are asso-
ciated with a set of attributes; the secret key SKf corresponding to a predicate
f can be used to decrypt a ciphertext associated with an attribute set I if
and only if f(I) = 1. Katz, Sahai, and Waters [17] also introduced the idea of
attribute-hiding, a security notion for PE that is stronger than the basic secu-
rity requirement of payload-hiding. Roughly speaking, attribute-hiding requires
that a ciphertext conceal the associated attributes as well as the plaintext, while
payload-hiding only requires that a ciphertext conceal the plaintext. The special
case of inner product predicates is obtained by having each attribute correspond
to a vector x and each predicate fv correspond to a vector v, where fv(x) = 1
iﬀ x ·v = 0. (x ·v denotes the standard inner-product.) Note that they represent
a wide class of predicates including equality tests, disjunctions or conjunctions
of equality tests, and more generally, arbitrary CNF or DNF formulas.
Katz et al. [17] proposed the ﬁrst inner-product PE. Shi and Waters [29]
presented a delegation mechanism for a class of PE, which the admissible pred-
icates of the system are more limited than inner-product predicates. Okamota
and Takashima [24] presented a (hierarchical) delegation mechanism for a inner-
product PE scheme. Shen et al. [28] introduced a new security notion of PE
called predicate privacy and proposed a symmetric-key inner-product PE, which
achieves both plaintext privacy and predicate privacy. These schemes were
proven only selectively secure. Lweko et al. [18] proposed the ﬁrst fully secure
inner-product PE. Okamota and Takashima [25] presented a fully secure PE for
a wide class of admissible predicates, that are speciﬁed by non-monotone access
structures combined with inner-product predicates.
Bethencourt et al. [4] proposed the ﬁrst CP-ABE construction, which is only
proven secure under the generic group model. Cheung and Newport [11] pre-
sented a new CP-ABE construction that is proven to be secure under the stan-
dard model. The construction supports the types of access structures that are
represented by AND of diﬀerent attributes. The fully secure CP-ABE systems
for expressive access structures were proposed in [31,18].
Nishide et al. [23] introduced the notion of ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE
and proposed two concrete constructions. The admissible access structures in
their schemes can be expressed as AND gates on multi-valued attributes with
wildcards. Subsequently, some other ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE construc-
tions were proposed in [21,2]. However, all these schemes were only proven se-
lectively secure.
The dual system encryption methodology was introduced by Waters in [30].
It has been leveraged to obtain constructions of fully secure (H)IBE from simple
assumptions [30], fully secure (H)IBE with short ciphertexts [20], fully secure
(H)IBE and ABE with leakage resilience [19], fully secure ABE and inner-product
PE [18,25].
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1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some
standard notations and cryptographic deﬁnitions. In Section 3, we show how to
construct ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE supporting expressive access struc-
tures from attribute-hiding inner-product PE. In Section 4, we describe a more
eﬃcient ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE scheme but only supporting restricted
access structures. Finally, we state our conclusion in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
If S is a set, then s $← S denotes the operation of picking an element s uniformly
at random from S. Let N denote the set of natural numbers. If λ ∈ N then 1λ
denotes the string of λ ones. Let z ← A(x, y, . . .) denote the operation of running
an algorithm A with inputs (x, y, . . .) and output z. A function f(λ) is negligible
if for every c > 0 there exists a λc such that f(λ) < 1/λc for all λ > λc.
2.1 Composite Order Bilinear Groups
Composite order bilinear groups were ﬁrst introduced in [7]. We use bilinear
groups whose order is the product of three distinct primes.
Let G be an algorithm that takes as input a security parameter 1λ and outputs
a tuple (p, q, r,G,GT , eˆ), where p, q, r are distinct primes, G and GT are cyclic
groups of order N = pqr, and eˆ : G×G → GT is a map such that
1. (Bilinear) ∀g, h ∈ G, a, b ∈ ZN , eˆ(ga, hb) = eˆ(g, h)ab;
2. (Non-degenerate) ∃g ∈ G such that eˆ(g, g) has order N in GT .
We further require that multiplication in G and GT , as well as the bilinear
map eˆ, are computable in time polynomial in λ. We use Gp,Gq,Gr to denote
the subgroups of G having order p, q, and r, respectively. Observe that G =
Gp × Gq × Gr. Note also that if hp ∈ Gp and hq ∈ Gq then eˆ(hp, hq) = 1. A
similar rule holds whenever eˆ is applied to elements in distinct subgroups.
We now state the complexity assumptions we use. The ﬁrst assumption is just
the subgroup decision problem in the case where the group order is a product
of three primes. We justify these assumptions in Appendix A by proving that
they hold in the generic group model assuming ﬁnding a non-trivial factor of
the group order N is hard. Note that our assumptions are non-interactive (in
contrast to, e.g., the LRSW assumption [8]) and of ﬁxed size (in contrast to,
e.g., the q-SDH assumption [6]).
Assumption 1. Let G be as above. We define the following distribution:
(p, q, r,G,GT , eˆ) ← G(1λ), N = pqr, gp $← Gp, gr $← Gr,
D = (G,GT , N, eˆ, gp, gr),
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T1
$← Gp ×Gq, T2 $← Gp.
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 1 is defined as
Adv1A = |Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T2) = 1]|.
Definition 1. we say G satisfies Assumption 1 if for any polynomial time algo-
rithm A, Adv1A is negligible.
Assumption 2. Let G be as above. We define the following distribution:
(p, q, r,G,GT , eˆ) ← G(1λ), N = pqr,
gp, X1
$← Gp, X2 $← Gq, gr $← Gr,
D = (G,GT , N, eˆ, gp, X1X2, gr),
T1
$← Gp ×Gq, T2 $← Gp.
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 2 is defined as
Adv2A = |Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T2) = 1]|.
Definition 2. we say G satisfies Assumption 2 if for any polynomial time algo-
rithm A, Adv2A is negligible.
Assumption 3. Let G be as above. We define the following distribution:
(p, q, r,G,GT , eˆ) ← G(1λ), N = pqr,
ω, s ∈ ZN , gp, Z1 $← Gp, X2, Y2, Z2 $← Gq, gr $← Gr,
D = (G,GT , N, eˆ, gp, gωp X2, g
s
pY2, Z1Z2, gr),
T1 = eˆ(gp, gp)ωs, T2
$← GT .
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 3 is defined as
Adv3A = |Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T2) = 1]|.
Definition 3. we say G satisfies Assumption 3 if for any polynomial time algo-
rithm A, Adv3A is negligible.
Assumption 4. Let G be as above. We define the following distribution:
(p, q, r,G,GT , eˆ) ← G(1λ), N = pqr,
a ∈ ZN , gp $← Gp, gq, Q1, Q2, Q $← Gq, gr, R0, R1, R $← Gr,
D = (G,GT , N, eˆ, gpR0, gapR1, gpQ1, g
1/a
p Q2, gq, gr),
T1 = gapQR, T2
$← GT .
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 4 is defined as
Adv4A = |Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]− Pr[A(D,T2) = 1]|.
Definition 4. we say G satisfies Assumption 4 if for any polynomial time algo-
rithm A, Adv4A is negligible.
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2.2 Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) scheme consists of the
following four algorithms:
Setup(1λ). Takes as input a security parameter λ. It outputs a public key PK
and a master secret key MSK.
KeyGen(PK,MSK, S). Takes as input the public key PK, the master secret key
MSK and a set of attributes S. It outputs a secret key SKS .
Encrypt(PK,m,A). Takes as input the public key PK, a message m and an
access structure A. It outputs a ciphertext c.
Decrypt(PK, SKS , c). Takes as input the public key PK, a secret key SKS and a
ciphertext c. It outputs a message m.
Let (PK,MSK) ← Setup(1λ), SKS ← KeyGen(PK,MSK, S), c ←
Encrypt(PK,m,A). For correctness, we require the following to hold:
1. If the set S of attributes satisﬁes the access structure A, then m ←
Decrypt(PK, SKS , c);
2. Otherwise, with overwhelming probability, Decrypt(PK, SKS , c) outputs a
random message.
2.3 Security Model for CP-ABE
The security model for ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE in previous construc-
tions [23,21,2] is a weak model, since the adversary must commit to the challenge
ciphertext policies before the setup phase. The weak model can be considered
to be analogous to the selective-ID model [9,5] used in IBE schemes.
We now give the full security model for ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE,
described as a security game between a challenger and an adversary A. The
game proceeds as follows:
Setup. The challenger runs Setup(1λ) to obtain a public key PK and a master
secret key MSK. It gives the public key PK to the adversary A and keeps
MSK to itself.
Query phase 1. The adversary A adaptively queries the challenger for secret
keys corresponding to sets of attributes S1, . . . , Sq. In response, the chal-
lenger runs SKSi ← KeyGen(PK,MSK, Si) and gives the secret key SKSi to
A, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
Challenge. The adversary A submits two (equal length) messages m0,m1 and
two access structures A0,A1, subject to the restriction that, A0 and A1
cannot be satisﬁed by any of the queried attribute sets. The challenger selects
a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, sets c∗ = Encrypt(PK,mβ ,Aβ) and sends c∗ to the
adversary as its challenge ciphertext.
Query phase 2. The adversary continues to adaptively query the challenger
for secret keys corresponding to sets of attributes with the added restriction
that none of these satisﬁes A0 and A1.
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Guess. The adversary A outputs its guess β′ ∈ {0, 1} for β and wins the game
if β = β′.
The advantage of the adversary in this game is deﬁned as |Pr[β = β′]− 12 | where
the probability is taken over the random bits used by the challenger and the
adversary.
Definition 5. Aciphertext-policyattribute-basedencryption scheme is ciphertext-
policy hiding (or fully secure) if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a neg-
ligible advantage in this security game.
2.4 Inner-Product PE
A inner-product PE consists of the following four algorithms [17]:
Setup(1λ) Takes as input a security parameter λ. It outputs a public key PK
and a master secret key MSK.
KeyGen(PK,MSK,v) Takes as input the public key PK, the master secret key
MSK and a vector v. It outputs a secret key SKv .
Encrypt(PK,m,x) Takes as input the public key PK, a message m and a vector
x. It outputs a ciphertext c.
Decrypt(PK, SKv, c) Takes as input the public key PK, a secret key SKv and a
ciphertext c. It outputs a message m. We require that, if x · v = 0 then
m ← Decrypt(PK, SKv,Encrypt(PK,m,x)).
The security model for inner-product PE is deﬁned using the following game
between an adversary A and a challenger.
Setup. The challenger runs Setup(1λ) to obtain a public key PK and a master
secret key MSK. It gives the public key PK to the adversary A and keeps
MSK to itself.
Query phase 1. The adversaryA adaptively makes secret key queries for pred-
icate vectors, v. In response, the challenger gives the corresponding secret
key SKv ← KeyGen(PK,MSK,v) to A.
Challenge. The adversary A submits two (equal length) messages m0,m1 and
two attribute vectors x0,x1, subject to the restriction that, v · x0 = 0 and
v · x1 = 0 for all the secret key queried predicate vectors, v. The challenger
selects a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, sets c∗ = Encrypt(PK,mβ ,xβ) and sends c∗
to the adversary as its challenge ciphertext.
Query phase 2. The adversary continues to adaptively issue secret key queries
for additional predicate vectors, v, subject to the restriction that v · x0 =
0 and v · x1 = 0. A is given the corresponding secret key SKv ←
KeyGen(PK,MSK,v) to A.
Guess. The adversary A outputs its guess β′ ∈ {0, 1} for β and wins the game
if β = β′.
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The advantage of the adversary in this game is deﬁned as |Pr[β = β′]− 12 | where
the probability is taken over the random bits used by the challenger and the
adversary.
Definition 6. A inner-product PE scheme is attribute-hiding (or fully secure)
if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in this
security game.
3 CP-ABE from Inner-Product PE
In this section, we describe the generic construction of ciphertext-policy hiding
CP-ABE from attribute-hiding inner-product PE formally. This CP-ABE sup-
ports a wide range of access structures on attributes, including arbitrary CNF
and DNF formulas. An example of such access structures is
Department : CIA
AND (Position : Manager OR Seniority : Senior).
Suppose that Π is a fully secure (namely attribute hiding) inner-product PE
scheme with algorithms Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt. We now construct a
fully secure CP-ABE scheme by deﬁning the corresponding CP-ABE algorithms
as speciﬁed in Subsection 2.2.
Setup(1λ). Given a security parameter λ, this algorithm ﬁrst runs
(Π.PK, Π.MSK) ← Π.Setup(1λ)
and then sets the system’s public key PK and master secret key SK as
(PK, SK) = (Π.PK, Π.MSK).
Encrypt(PK,m,A). Given an access structure A, which is a CNF or DNF for-
mula, this algorithm ﬁrst represents the access structure A by a multivariate
polynomial p.
Note that, if we assume that there are t categories of attributes in the
CP-ABE system, and that every user has t attributes with each attribute be-
longing to a diﬀerent category, then arbitrary CNF or DNF formulas can be
represented by polynomials in t variables of degree at most d in each variable.
Let x be the (d+1)t-element coeﬃcient vector of the polynomial p. Then
the algorithm runs
Π.c ← Π.Encrypt(PK,m,x)
and outputs c = Π.c.
KeyGen(PK,MSK, S). Given the public key PK, the master secret key MSK and
a set of attributes S, this algorithm ﬁrst represents the set of attributes S
by a (d + 1)t-element vector v. Then the algorithm runs
Π.SKv ← Π.KeyGen(PK,MSK,v)
and outputs a secret key SKS = Π.SKv.
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Decrypt(PK, SKS , c). Given the public key PK, a secret key SKS and a ciphertext
c. The decryption algorithm runs
Π.m ← Π.Decrypt(PK, SKS , c)
and outputs m = Π.m.
It is easy to observe that, if the inner-product PE scheme Π is attribute-hiding,
then the proposed CP-ABE scheme supporting arbitrary CNF or DNF formulas
is ciphertext-policy hiding.
Now, we give an example to show how arbitrary CNF or DNF formulas and
sets of attributes can be represented by a (d+1)t-element vector. Suppose that,
in the CP-ABE system, there are t = 3 categories of attributes: Department,
Position and Seniority, and d = 1. Then, the access structure
A = Department : CIA
AND (Position : Manager OR Seniority : Senior)
can be represented by the polynomial
p(x1, x2, x3)
= r(x1 − I1) + (x2 − I2) · (x3 − I3)
= 0 · x1x2x3 + 0 · x1x2 + 0 · x1x3 + 1 · x2x3 + r · x1
+(−I3) · x2 + (−I2) · x3 + (I2I3 − rI1),
where r is chosen from ZN at random, I1 = H(Department : CIA), I2 =
H(Position : Manager), I3 = H(Seniority : Senior) and H is a collision-
resistant hash function from {0, 1}∗ to ZN . Hence, the access structure associated
with ciphertexts can be represented by a (d + 1)t = 23 = 8-element vector
x = (0, . . . , 0, 1, r,−I3,−I2, I2I3 − rI1).
On the other hand, a user with a set of attributes S = (Department :
CIA, Position : Director, Seniority : Senior) also can be represented by an 8-
element vector























where I ′1 = H(Department : CIA), I
′




It is obvious that if the set of attributes of a user S satisﬁes the access structure
A, then x · v = 0.
4 CP-ABE Supporting Restricted Access Structures
In this section, we propose a ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE scheme which
supports access structures with AND operation on multi-valued attributes with
wildcards. An example of such access structures is
Department : CIA AND Position : Manager
AND (Seniority : Junior OR Seniority : Senior).
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The ciphertext size of the scheme is O(n × ), where n is the number of
categories of attributes in the system and  is the number of possible values in
each category. Note that, as showed in Section 3, we can construct fully secure
CP-ABE supporting the same access structures from inner-product PE, but the
ciphertext size of such a scheme is ( + 1)n.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there are n categories of attributes
and that every user has n attributes with each attribute belonging to a diﬀerent
category.
We will associate each attribute with a unique element in ZN . Let the n× 
matrix V = (V1, . . . , Vi, . . . , Vn) be the possible attributes in the universe, where
the vector Vi = (vi,1, . . . , vi,j , . . . , vi,) and vi,j ∈ ZN . We also assume that Vi
be the set of all possible values of the ith category attribute. In other words, if
S = (w1, . . . , wi, . . . , wn) denotes the set of attributes of a user, then wi ∈ Vi.
So, to keep the presentation clear, let S = (v1,j1 , v2,j2 , . . . , vi,ji , . . . , vn,jn) denote
the set of attributes of a user, where ji ∈ {1, . . . , }.
Denote the restricted ciphertext policy as A = (W1, . . . ,Wn), where Wi ⊆ Vi.
The set of attributes S = (v1,j1 , v2,j2 , . . . , vi,ji , . . . , vn,jn) satisﬁes the ciphertext
policy A if and only if vi,ji ∈ Wi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The CP-ABE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
Setup(1λ). The setup algorithm ﬁrst runs G(1λ) to obtain (p, q, r,G,GT , eˆ) with
G = Gp × Gq × Gr, where G and GT are cyclic groups of order N = pqr.
Next it picks generators gp, qr of Gp,Gr, respectively, then chooses ai,j ∈ ZN
and Ri,j ∈ Gr uniformly at random for i = 1 to n and j = 1 to . It also
chooses ω ∈ ZN and R0 ∈ Gr uniformly at random. The public key is
PK = (A0 = gp ·R0, {Ai,j = gai,jp ·Ri,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤,
gr, Y = eˆ(gp, gp)ω).
and the master secret key is
MSK = (gp, {ai,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤, ω).
KeyGen(PK,MSK, S). Let S = (v1,j1 , v2,j2 , . . . , vi,ji , . . . , vn,jn) with ji ∈
{1, . . . , }, and recall
MSK = (gp, {ai,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤, ω).
This algorithm chooses ti ∈ ZN uniformly at random for i = 1 to n, and sets
t =
∑n
i=1 ti. It then computes D0 = g
ω−t
p . For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it also computes
Di = g
ti/ai,ji
p . Finally, it outputs the secret key
SKS = (D0, {Di}1≤i≤n).
Encrypt(PK,m,A). Let A = (W1, . . . ,Wn) with Wi ⊆ Vi. This algorithm
chooses random s ∈ ZN and R′0 ∈ Gr. It also chooses random si,j ∈ ZN
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and R′i,j ∈ Gr for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ . It then computes C˜ = m ·Y s and





Asi,j · R′i,j , if vi,j ∈ Wi;
A
si,j
i,j ·R′i,j , otherwise.
Finally, it outputs the ciphertext
c = (C˜, C0, {Ci,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤).
Note that, a random element R ∈ Gr can be sampled by choosing random
δ ∈ ZN and setting R = gδr .
Decrypt(PK, SKS , c). Let c = (C˜, C0, {Ci,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤), SKS =





i=1 eˆ(Ci,ji , Di)
.
Correctness. Let SKS and c be as above. If the set of attributes S =





i=1 eˆ(Ci,ji , Di)
=
m · Y s









m · eˆ(gp, gp)ωs
eˆ(gsp, g
ω−t






m · eˆ(gp, gp)ωs
eˆ(gsp, g
ω−t
p ) ·∏ni=1 eˆ(gsp, gtip )
=
m · eˆ(gp, gp)ωs
eˆ(gsp, gωp )
= m.
Recently, Freeman [12] proposed a method for transforming schemes secure
in the composite-order setting into ones secure (under diﬀerent but analogous
assumptions) in the prime-order setting. We can use the method to transform
our scheme into one in the prime-order setting. Now, we turn to security.
Theorem 1. Suppose that G satisfies Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4. Then the
proposed CP-ABE is ciphertext-policy hiding.
Proof. To obtain full security, we apply the dual system encryption concept
recently introduced by Waters [30]. We ﬁrst deﬁne two additional structures:
semi-functional ciphertexts and semi-functional keys. These will not be used in
the real system, but will be used in our proof. A normal key can decrypt normal
or semi-functional ciphertexts, and a normal ciphertext can be decrypted by
normal or semi-functional keys. However, when a semi-functional key is used to
decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, decryption will fail.
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Semi-functional Ciphertext. Let gq denote a generator of the subgroup Gq.
A semi-functional ciphertext is created as follows:
1. First, a normal ciphertext
c′ = (C˜′, C′0, {C′i,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤),
is generated by the encryption algorithm Encrypt.
2. Random exponents x0, xi,j ∈ ZN are chosen for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ .
3. Then, the semi-functional ciphertext c is set to be
c = (C˜ = C˜′, C0 = C′0 · gx0q , {Ci,j = C′i,j · gxi,jq }1≤i≤n,1≤j≤).
Semi-functional Key. Let gq denote a generator of the subgroup Gq. A semi-
functional key is created as follows:
1. First, a normal key SK′S = (D′0, {D′i}1≤i≤n) is generated by the key
generation algorithm KeyGen.
2. Random exponents y0, yi ∈ ZN are chosen for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
3. Then, the semi-functional key SKS is set to be
SKS = (D0 = D′0 · gy0q , {Di = D′i · gyiq }1≤i≤n).
We will prove security by a hybrid argument using a sequence of games. The
ﬁrst game, Game 0, will be the real security game. In Game 1 (or Game 2-
0), all the keys are normal and the ciphertext is semi-functional. In Game 2-k,
the ciphertext given to the adversary is semi-functional and the ﬁrst k keys are
semi-functional. The rest of the keys are normal. In Game 3, all the keys are
semi-functional, and the ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random
message, not one of the messages provided by the adversary.
Then our proof relies on four lemmas, whose formal descriptions and proofs
will be given in the full version of the paper. Lemma 1 states that Game 0 and
Game 1 (i.e., Game 2-0) are indistinguishable. For 1 ≤ k ≤ ν, where ν denotes
the number of secret key queries the adversary makes, Lemma 2 states Game 2-
(k-1) and Game 2-k are indistinguishable. Lemma 3 states Game 2-ν and Game
3 are indistinguishable; and ﬁnally Lemma 4 states that the advantage of the
adversary in Game 3 is negligible. Therefore, we conclude that the advantage
of the adversary in Game 0 (i.e., the real security game) is negligible. This
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we described the construction of ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE
from inner-product PE formally. We also proposed a more eﬃcient ciphertext-
policy hiding CP-ABE construction but only supporting restricted access struc-
tures. Compared with previous ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE constructions,
our schemes were proven fully secure. Note that we used some non-standard
complexity assumptions. A further direction is to ﬁnd more eﬃcient and expres-
sive ciphertext-policy hiding CP-ABE constructions from simple assumptions in
the full security model.
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Appendix A
We now prove that our complexity assumptions hold in the generic group model,
as long as it is hard to ﬁnd a nontrivial factor of the group order,N . We prove this
by applying the theorems of Katz et al. [16]. Let g1, g2, g3 be random generators of
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and every element of GT can be expressed as eˆ(g1, g1)a1 eˆ(g2, g2)a2 eˆ(g3, g3)a3 for
some values of a1, a2, a3.We denote an element of G,GT by (a1, a2, a3), [a1, a2, a3],
respectively. We adopt the notation of [16] to express our assumptions. We use
capital letters to denote random variables, and reuse random variables to denote
relationships between elements.
Assumption 1. We can express this assumption as:
A1 = (1, 0, 0), A2 = (0, 0, 1), T1 = (X1, X2, 0), T2 = (X1, 0, 0).
Let S = {i|eˆ(T1, Ai) = eˆ(T2, Ai)}. We note that S = ∅ in this case. It is clear
that T1 and T2 are both independent of {A1, A2} because X1 does not appear in
A1 or A2. According to Theorem A.2 of [16], thus, Assumption 1 is generically
secure, assuming it is hard to ﬁnd a nontrivial factor of N .
Assumption 2. We can express this assumption as:
A1 = (1, 0, 0), A2 = (X1, 1, 0), A3 = (0, 0, 1),
T1 = (Y1, Y2, 0), T2 = (Y1, 0, 0).
Let S = {i|eˆ(T1, Ai) = eˆ(T2, Ai)}. We note that S = {2} in this case. It is clear
that T1 and T2 are both independent of {Ai} because Y1 does not appear in {Ai}.
We see that eˆ(T1, A2) is independent of {eˆ(Ai, Aj)} ∪ {eˆ(T1, Ai)}i=2 because it
is impossible to obtain X1Y1 in the ﬁrst coordinate of a combination of elements
of {eˆ(Ai, Aj)} ∪ {eˆ(T1, Ai)}i=2. This also allows to conclude that eˆ(T2, A2) is
independent of {eˆ(Ai, Aj)} ∪ {eˆ(T2, Ai)}i=2. According to Theorem A.2 of [16],
thus, Assumption 2 is generically secure, assuming it is hard to ﬁnd a nontrivial
factor of N .
Assumption 3. We can express this assumption as:
A1 = (1, 0, 0), A2 = (X1, 1, 0), A3 = (Y1, Y2, 0), A4 = (Z1, Z2, 0), A5 = (0, 0, 1),
T1 = [X1Y1, 0, 0], T2 = [W1,W2,W3].
T1 is independent of {eˆ(Ai, Aj)} because the only way to obtain X1Y1 in the
ﬁrst coordinate is to take eˆ(A2, A3), but then we are left with a Y2 in the second
coordinate that cannot be canceled. T2 is independent of {eˆ(Ai, Aj)} because
W1,W2,W3 do not appear in {Ai}. According to Theorem A.1 of [16], thus, As-
sumption 3 is generically secure, assuming it is hard to ﬁnd a nontrivial factor
of N .
Assumption 4. We can express this assumption as:
A1 = (1, 0, 1), A2 = (X1, 0, X3), A3 = (1, 1, 0),
A4 = (1/X1, X2, 0), A5 = (0, Y2, 0),
A6 = (0, 0, Y3), T1 = (X1, Z2, Z3), T2 = (Z1, Z2, Z3).
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Let S = {i|eˆ(T1, Ai) = eˆ(T2, Ai)}. We note that S = {1, 2, 3, 4} in this case.
It is clear that T1 and T2 are both independent of {Ai} because Z2 does
not appear in {Ai}. We see that eˆ(T1, A1) is independent of {eˆ(Ai, Aj)} ∪
{eˆ(T1, Ai)}i=1 and eˆ(T2, A1) is independent of {eˆ(Ai, Aj)} ∪ {eˆ(T2, Ai)}i=1 be-
cause we cannot obtain Z3 in the third coordinate. We note that eˆ(T1, A2)
is independent of {eˆ(Ai, Aj)} ∪ {eˆ(T1, Ai)}i=2 and eˆ(T2, A2) is independent of
{eˆ(Ai, Aj)}∪{eˆ(T2, Ai)}i=2 because we cannot obtain X3Z3 in the third coordi-
nate. We also note that eˆ(T1, A3) is independent of {eˆ(Ai, Aj)} ∪ {eˆ(T1, Ai)}i=3
and eˆ(T2, A3) is independent of {eˆ(Ai, Aj)} ∪ {eˆ(T2, Ai)}i=3 because we can-
not obtain Z2 in the second coordinate. We similarly note that eˆ(T1, A4) is
independent of {eˆ(Ai, Aj)} ∪ {eˆ(T1, Ai)}i=4 and eˆ(T2, A4) is independent of
{eˆ(Ai, Aj)} ∪ {eˆ(T2, Ai)}i=4 because we cannot obtain X2Z2 in the second co-
ordinate. According to Theorem A.2 of [16], thus, Assumption 4 is generically
secure, assuming it is hard to ﬁnd a nontrivial factor of N .
